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I.  YOUR PARENTS’ INTERNET 
John Perry Barlow, who was honored with a symposium here at 
Duke just last year, famously wrote, in 1996, what he called “A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.”1 “Governments of 
the Industrial World,” he wrote, “you weary giants of flesh and steel, I 
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the 
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 †  William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; Partner, Durie Tangri LLP. Thanks 
to Anupam Chander, Rose Hagan, David Lange, Noah Phillips, Peter Swire, and the participants 
at the Lange Lecture at Duke, where this talk was given. This is a lightly edited version of a 
speech, and it reads like it. While I thought I had come up with a clever title, it turns out someone 
else beat me to it. See SCOTT MALCOMSON, SPLINTERNET: HOW GEOPOLITICS AND COMMERCE 
ARE FRAGMENTING THE WORLD WIDE WEB (2016). His focus, unlike mine, is on the history of 
the internet and its deep ties to government. 
 I gave this speech in January 2020, when only a few people had heard of COVID-19 as a 
distant problem. I have updated it but not revised it to take account of the changed world in which 
we are currently living. But I think the pandemic only makes the importance of the internet and 
global communication more important. 
 1. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/WM35-
AE92].  
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future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome 
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”2  
John Gilmore, another famous internet pioneer, in 1993 coined 
the famous aphorism “The Net interprets censorship as damage and 
routes around it.”3  
Now, that was a long time ago. You can tell it was a long time ago 
because we hadn’t settled on what we were actually going to call the 
internet. Maybe it was cyberspace, maybe it was the net. Infobahn was 
floating around there at the time.4  
These sentiments sound somewhat quaint by modern standards. 
But it’s worth remembering—or learning—that the internet of that day 
was the underground pirate alternative to where everybody thought 
information technology was going. The corporate and government big 
boys had a plan: we were going to build broadband wires for an 
information superhighway. The information superhighway was going 
to deliver prepackaged content to you in a one-way pipe with five 
hundred channels of television.5 And that was going to be our 
technology connection. The idea that we might actually want to share 
information ourselves rather than merely passively consume it hadn’t 
made it into the consciousness of the people who were building the 
technology.6  
The internet, by contrast—what supplanted the information 
superhighway—started as a niche government-academic project to 
 
 2. Id.  
 3. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME INT’L (Dec. 6, 1993), http://
kirste.userpage.fu-berlin.de/outerspace/internet-article.html [https://perma.cc/AJ3J-JY8Y] (quoting 
John Gilmore). 
 4. See Information Superhighway, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/information%20superhighway [https://perma.cc/KLX8-VRMT]. 
 5. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/AIMD-95-23, INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAY: AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES 16 (1995), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/160/154844.pdf [https://perma.cc/92LZ-B8DN]. 
 6. As an aside, this is the grain of truth to the oft-mocked claim by Al Gore that he invented 
the internet. He was instrumental in funding broadband connections to build the planned 
information superhighway. See David Mikkelson, Did Al Gore Say ‘I Invented the Internet’?, 
SNOPES (May 5, 2005), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/internet-of-lies [https://perma.cc/
YN4L-83MZ] (“During my service in the United States Congress, I took the initiative in creating 
the Internet. I took the initiative in moving forward a whole range of initiatives that have proven 
to be important to our country’s economic growth and environmental protection, improvements 
in our educational system.” (quoting Transcript: Vice President Gore on CNN’s ‘Late Edition,’ 
CNN (Mar. 9, 1999, 5:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/president.
2000/transcript.gore/index.html [https://perma.cc/A753-YLLE])). 
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allow academics and military folks to communicate together.7 Indeed, 
in the early days of the internet commercial entities weren’t even 
allowed on unless they had some connection to the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) and the research agencies.8 It 
wasn’t until 1991 that they actually had unrestricted access to what we 
think of today as the web.9 What became the private internet started as 
a series of “walled gardens,” a bunch of people who wanted to get 
together in small communities like the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link—
the “WELL”—or AOL, Prodigy, and CompuServe.10 
What the internet did was something quite remarkable. It allowed 
people to connect outside those walled gardens. It allowed you to 
interact with someone who wasn’t part of a preexisting community, 
who wasn’t geographically near you, who wasn’t in the same 
community of scholarship and the same community of thought with 
you. And that connection turned out to be extraordinarily and 
unexpectedly valuable.  
II.  THE SPLINTERING OF THE INTERNET 
My thesis is that the internet is being balkanized. We are returning 
to walled gardens. Some of those walled gardens are run by private 
companies, but increasingly, they are being created by drawing 
national boundaries around the internet. I think this phenomenon is 
already far along, and there are powerful forces behind it. The 
balkanization of the internet is a bad thing, and we should stop it if we 
can.  
Now, I’m going to pause here and note that there should be a fairly 
heavy presumption against my argument. I am not the first person to 
 
 7. Janet Abbate, Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet, 75 BUS. HIST. REV. 
147, 147–49 (2001).  
 8. J. Postel & J. Reynolds, Domain Requirements [RFC 920], IETF: IETF DOCUMENTS 2 
(Oct. 1984), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc920 [https://perma.cc/M8VS-FWQB] (creating the top-
level domains starting in 1985); John Naughton, The Evolution of the Internet: From Military 
Experiment to General Purpose Technology, 1 J. CYBER POL’Y 5, 5 (2016) (“For the first two 
decades of its existence, it was the preserve of a technological, academic, and research elite.”).  
 9. Martin Bryant, 20 Years Ago Today, The World Wide Web Opened to the Public, NEXT 
WEB (Aug. 6, 2011), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/06/20-years-ago-today-the-world-
wide-web-opened-to-the-public [https://perma.cc/D6V6-2775]. 
 10. AOL’s ‘Walled Garden,’ WALL ST. J. EUR. (Sept. 4, 2000, 11:57 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB968104011203980910 [https://perma.cc/Z7V4-WB3F]. 
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say that the internet is in trouble and is going to die.11 And this is not 
even the first time I’ve said it.12 The internet has shown surprising 
resilience, and we shouldn’t just assume it’s going to go away. 
Nonetheless, I hope to convince you that there is a real problem here 
and that we should be concerned about it.  
A. Nationalizing Software and Regulation 
One way to think about this problem is to take John Gilmore’s 
aphorism and reverse it. John Gilmore said in 1993 that “[t]he Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”13 The idea was 
that we had a distributed network that can avoid centralized control. 
Today, I think it’s fairer to say that censorship interprets the internet 
as damage and routes around it. As I argue here, governments have, in 
fact, figured out ways to avoid or control efforts of the internet to get 
around their censorship.  
So, let me start by trying to persuade you that we are balkanizing 
the internet. That might seem an odd claim. If you look around, by all 
accounts it’s the giants of technology who increasingly run everything. 
Google, Facebook, and Apple are everywhere in our world. That 
seems like centralization, not decentralization.  
That’s true for most of you because you’re in the United States. 
But outside the United States, things look very different. We worry in 
the United States about decades-dominant platforms, but those 
platforms aren’t actually dominant in most of the world.  
If you go to China, you will not find Google and Facebook at all, 
and you will not find Apple as a dominant player. The sites that 
dominate the Chinese internet ecosystem are WeChat, Baidu, and 
 
 11. See, e.g., Sara Morrison, The Trump Administration’s Flawed Plan To Destroy the 
Internet as We Know It, VOX (June 18, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/18/
21294331/section-230-bill-barr-josh-hawley-trump-internet-free-speech [https://perma.cc/5P63-
BLRD] (“Section 230, the law that is often credited as the reason why the internet as we know it 
exists, could be facing its greatest threat yet.”); Shelly Palmer, The Death of the Internet? Stop 
Saying That, AD AGE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://adage.com/article/digitalnext/death-internet/311673 
[https://perma.cc/4SEX-BQX5] (“‘If net neutrality is repealed, the internet will die!’ I’m 
paraphrasing, of course, but this is what many proponents of net neutrality believe. My issue with 
this line of thinking is that the idea presupposes the internet was previously alive and well. It was 
not.”). 
 12. See generally Mark A. Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the 
Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011) (stressing that in 2011 two congressional bills posed 
serious threats to the internet). 
 13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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Tencent.14 If you go to Russia, you’ll find Yandex, not Google, as the 
dominant internet company.15  
And I think, increasingly, this is going to turn out to be true in 
Europe, which is a bit of a special case. Europe is targeting and 
restricting U.S. companies on the internet for both policy and 
mercantilist reasons.16 And I think they will end up either moving 
European consumers to separate European internet companies and 
internet technologies or, perhaps, co-opting U.S. companies in ways 
that still end up dividing the U.S. experience from the European 
experience.  
If you look at the rest of the world, what you see is actually an 
ongoing nation-by-nation competition for who gets the internet. And 
that competition is not one that the United States is necessarily going 
to win. To date, countries like Brazil and India have been primarily 
adopting U.S. technology companies and U.S. technology platforms,17 
though there’s reason to think that’s about to change.18  
But if you look at Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
others, those countries are buying into the Chinese model.19 And the 
 
 14. China’s Top 10 Internet Companies in 2019, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 27, 2019, 6:40 AM), 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201908/27/WS5d645fc1a310cf3e35567f97.html [https://perma.cc/
R6RU-WHL4].  
 15. With 56% of Market Share, Yandex Is Confirmed as the Leading Search Engine in Russia 
– Gargiullo: “The Key to Selling in Europe’s Biggest Market,” PR.COM (Oct. 10, 2019), https://
www.pr.com/press-release/796700 [https://perma.cc/32XJ-L2B2]. 
 16. Julia Reda, Why Americans Should Worry About the New EU Copyright Rules, MEDIUM: 
BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. COLLECTION (Dec. 20, 2019), https://link.medium.com/0BDd6WFMBab 
[https://perma.cc/557P-HRRE]. For further discussion of EU regulations, see infra notes 30–33 
and accompanying text. 
 17. Matthew Capala, Global Search Engine Market Share for 2018 in the Top 15 GDP 
Nations, MEDIUM (Aug. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@SearchDecoder/global-search-engine-
market-share-for-2018-in-the-top-15-gdp-nations-2cf65c11e5f5 [https://perma.cc/B9DR-LB9R]; 
World Map of Social Networks, VINCOS BLOG (Jan. 2020), https://vincos.it/world-map-of-social-
networks [https://perma.cc/LYT9-ZKU7].  
 18. See infra notes 37–46 and accompanying text.  
 19. Lulu Yilun Chen & Yoolim Lee, The U.S. Is Losing a Major Front to China in the New 
Cold War, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-04-14/china-wins-allies-for-web-vision-in-ideological-battle-with-u-s [https://perma.cc/
3X86-3GW9] (noting that “Vietnam and Thailand are among the Southeast Asian nations 
warming to” China’s restrictive internet governance model); Krishna N. Das, Malaysia’s 5G 
Plan a Potential Boon for China’s Huawei, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2019, 3:20 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5g-malaysia/malaysias-5g-plan-a-potential-boon-for-
chinas-huawei-idUSKBN1W90RD [https://perma.cc/Z448-2NLT] (noting Malaysia’s adoption 
of Chinese 5G technology); Ma Jingjing, Chinese Tech Companies Flock to Indonesia To 
Capitalize on Booming Internet Economy, GLOB. TIMES (China) (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:23 PM), 
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companies that end up running the internet in those countries will 
increasingly be the Baidus and WeChats of the world, not the Googles 
and Facebooks.  
That’s also true in many countries in Africa and even Latin 
America, where China is building the physical infrastructure,20 and it’s 
increasingly easy for them to also build the software and technological 
infrastructure. So, while many countries have dominant private 
internet players, they’re not the same private player.  
The competition is not just for what company runs large aspects of 
your life. Instead, I think it reflects competition between regulatory 
models that are going to determine whether the internet as we know it 
will continue to exist in any given country.  
In the United States, we largely listened to Barlow, at least in the 
1990s and at least where the sacred cow of intellectual property (“IP”) 
wasn’t at issue. We let the technology companies get largely free rein. 
They ended up controlling your data, and that’s a potential problem 
for many people.21 But by and large, people have been free to post what 
they want, and they’ve been free to share it on whatever platform they 
want. There’s reason to think that’s going to change in the current 
political climate. The U.S. internet is under a lot of pressure from a 
variety of sources.22 But if it does change, it’s as likely to be in the 
direction of less private filtering of content and more First Amendment 
protection for hate speech as the reverse.23 So, I think the freedom of 
the U.S. internet, with its good and bad aspects, is and will remain the 
U.S. model.  
 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1133239.shtml [https://perma.cc/32VR-HLMX] (noting 
Chinese investment in tech in Indonesia). 
 20. Paul Nantulya, Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt One Road Strategy, AFR. 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-
africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy [https://perma.cc/YC9L-AXYV]; Pepe Zhang, Belt and 
Road in Latin America: A Regional Game Changer?, ATL. COUNCIL (Oct. 8, 2019), https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/belt-and-road-in-latin-america-a-
regional-game-changer [https://perma.cc/76AL-34RT]. 
 21. Sam Schechner, Privacy Problems Mount for Tech Giants, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2019, 
6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/privacy-problems-mount-for-tech-giants-11548070201 
[https://perma.cc/8F4F-MXG8].  
 22. Both the left and the right have attacked § 230, the core law that preserves internet 
freedom from legal liability. Morrison, supra note 11. On the importance of § 230, see generally 
JEFF KOSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019), and Anupam 
Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639 (2014). 
 23. See Mark A. Lemley, The Contradictions of Platform Regulation (Feb. 3, 2021) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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IP is a big exception. U.S. copyright industries have tried for some 
time to shut down as much of the internet as possible.24 I think they’ve 
given up trying to shut it down altogether, but they would like to lock 
it down to the extent possible.25 One way they accomplish that is 
through geoblocking.26 And increasingly, their efforts are being 
accommodated by U.S. tech companies who are coming to deals with 
the copyright companies to engage in various kinds of filtering.27 But 
outside IP, the U.S. approach to the internet has been fairly laissez-
faire. 
In Europe, by contrast, the content industries and the government 
get more, and more effective, control over the internet than they do in 
the United States. IP is once again a big driver. The copyright 
industries in Europe are quite influential, and the political leverage 
that U.S. tech companies have had, at least until recently, in the United 
States is not present in Europe. There is also a kind of nationalistic bias 
 
 24. For discussion of this history, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on 
the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125–35 (2011), and Mark A. 
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2004). 
 25. Copyright owners are now trying to replace the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime 
with “notice and stay down,” which requires internet intermediaries to find and filter out any 
content copyright owners consider infringing. See, e.g., Jonathan Bailey, Take Down and Stay 
Down—Rethinking the DMCA, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Mar. 28, 2016), https://
www.plagiarismtoday.com/2016/03/28/take-stay-rethinking-dmca [https://perma.cc/JPF9-
YACC]. Europe recently adopted such a system. Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17, 2019 O.J 
(L 130) 92, 95 (EU). The U.S. Copyright Office recently issued a report suggesting that the 
DMCA be changed to impose more obligations on intermediaries. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17 1–7 (May 2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/
section-512-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR6Q-3QXQ]. For criticism of these proposals, 
see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & Christopher Sprigman, Opinion, Why Notice-and-Takedown 
Is a Bit of Copyright Law Worth Saving, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sprigman-lemley-notice-and-takedown-dmca-20160621-
snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/8VCH-9UYZ]. 
 26. See generally Peter K. Yu, A Hater’s Guide to Geoblocking, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
503 (2019) (discussing “the copyright industries’ increasing demands for the use of geoblocking”). 
 27. Google, for instance, processes more than 2 million copyright takedown notices every day. 
Gina Hall, How Many Copyright Takedown Notices Does Google Handle Each Day? About 2 
Million, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Mar. 7, 2016, 7:28 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/
news/2016/03/07/how-many-copyright-takedown-notices-does-google.html [https://perma.cc/9R5S-
HQ3P]. And that is despite having spent hundreds of millions of dollars to build ContentID, a 
screening system for YouTube that proactively finds copyrighted content and blocks it or helps the 
copyright owner monetize it. YouTube has paid billions of dollars to rights owners through the 
system. James Hale, YouTube Has Paid Out More Than $3 Billion to Copyright Holders Through 
Content ID, TUBEFILTER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.tubefilter.com/2018/11/07/youtube-payouts-
content-id [https://perma.cc/QL9A-LGAP] (reporting over $3 billion in payouts as of 2018). 
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or Eurocentric bias against U.S. tech companies.28 And there’s much 
greater concern with privacy in Europe than there has been historically 
in the United States, a concern that recently manifested itself in a 
European court order blocking transfers of data to the United States 
because of concerns about U.S. surveillance.29 And all of that means 
the European Union is increasingly seeking, and increasingly getting, 
control over what goes out on the internet there.30  
European governments use that control primarily, but not 
exclusively, for commercial or mercantilist ends. They want their 
newspapers to be paid more. They want control over copyrighted 
works. They want privacy, for both good and bad purposes.31 Europe 
demands that companies not collect information about citizens, but it 
also wants its citizens to be able to hide bad public facts about them so 
that people can’t find out bad things that they’ve done in the past.32 
Europe is also more likely than the United States to control various 
kinds of hate speech, whether it’s Nazi memorabilia or other 
information that they find offensive.33 But by and large, Europe doesn’t 
look radically different than the United States. It’s just that the various 
forces who want commercial or personal restrictions on the internet 
have more power there than they do here.  
In China and Russia, the internet is effectively controlled by the 
political arm of the state, and those states are both surveilling and 
 
 28. James Kanter, E.U., Accused of Bias Against U.S. Companies, Opens Tax Inquiry into 
French Utility, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/business/
international/europe-us-tax-luxembourg-engie-vestager.html [https://perma.cc/UVD4-XTNJ]; 
Richard Waters & Sam Fleming, Google’s Friends and Foes Draw Line Over ‘Anti-American 
Bias,’ FIN. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f16372d2-5aea-11e7-9bc8-
8055f264aa8b [https://perma.cc/5LGT-X9ZZ].  
 29. A preliminary order has been issued. Sam Schechner & Emily Glazer, Ireland To Order 
Facebook To Stop Sending User Data to U.S., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/ireland-to-order-facebook-to-stop-sending-user-data-to-u-s-11599671980 
[https://perma.cc/3QN8-FZKM]. The order is implementing a recent decision holding that where 
data is transferred to third countries, those countries must comply with EU standards. Case C-
311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximillian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, 
¶ 203 (July 16, 2020). 
 30. ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EU RULES THE WORLD xii–xix 
(2020). 
 31. Id. at xiv, 248–49. 
 32. For a discussion of the European “right to be forgotten” and its abuse, see Daphne 
Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data 
Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 287, 287 (2018). 
 33. See, e.g., Adam Satariano, Britain Empowers Watchdog to Push for Policing of Internet 
Content, N.Y. TIMES (London), Feb. 13, 2020, at B4. 
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locking down speech they don’t like. You can’t talk about democracy, 
Falun Gong, Tiananmen Square, or more recently, Hong Kong 
elections on WeChat34 or you’ll just get shut down. That works because 
China has built a censorship system that works with the Chinese apps 
and software that almost everyone uses in those countries.35 And it has 
blocked or driven out many of the software programs that might 
challenge that censorship system.36 
India is an interesting example of a country that has traditionally 
had a relatively open internet but which seems to be moving very 
heavily in the direction of locking it down. They shut down the internet 
altogether in Kashmir for several months as part of a political attack 
and crackdown on the Muslim population there.37 And that model, I 
think, is increasingly likely to be used in India.  
It’s also increasingly likely to be used by authoritarian regimes 
around the world or authoritarian wannabes. These countries learned 
from Arab Spring the power of technology to potentially foment a 
revolution.38 And if you’re an authoritarian government, you don’t 
want a revolution. So, they want to be able to control—to lock down—
the means of communication.39 And they’ve learned from various other 
examples, such as China, Russia, and India, that they can shut down 
either individual companies—blocking Facebook until they take down 
posts they don’t like, for instance, or blocking Google until they do 
various things—or even that they can block the internet altogether to 
 
 34. Zoe Schiffer, WeChat Keeps Banning Chinese Americans for  Talking About Hong Kong, 
VERGE (Nov. 25, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/25/20976964/chinese-
americans-censorship-wechat-hong-kong-elections-tiktok [https://perma.cc/32EG-UYJ8].  
 35. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Firewall of China: Xi Jinping’s Internet Shutdown, 
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-
firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown [https://perma.cc/LN75-NELM]. 
 36. Julie E. Cohen, Networks, Standards, and Network-and-Standard-Based Governance, in 
AFTER THE DIGITAL TORNADO 58, 72 (Kevin Werbach ed., 2020); Jennifer Daskal & Paul Ohm, 
Debate: We Need To Protect Strong National Borders on the Internet, 17 COLO. TECH. L. REV. 13, 
19 (2018) (“China, Russia, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, for many years, have engineered central 
points of control and failure into communications networks.”). 
 37. Aijaz Hussain & Sheikh Saaliq, Security Lockdown Severely Curtails Internet Access, S.F. 
CHRON., Feb. 15, 2020, at A5; Jeffrey Gettleman, Vindu Goel & Maria Abi-Habib, With Protests 
on the Rise, India Makes a Habit of Blocking the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (New Delhi), Dec. 18, 2019, 
at A5. 
 38. Marc Lynch, How Arab Authoritarian Regimes Learned To Defeat Popular Protests, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2016/08/25/how-arab-authoritarian-regimes-learned-to-defeat-popular-protests [https://perma. 
cc/TN9S-QBK4]. 
 39. Daskal & Ohm, supra note 36, at 19. 
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prevent dissidents from organizing. Iran,40 Turkey,41 Malaysia,42 
Brazil,43 Pakistan,44 and various Arab countries have all blocked large 
parts of the internet at one time or another.45 Brazil has been most 
explicit. It has announced its intention to create a national, walled-off 
internet on the China model.46  
It’s not just differences in local regulations that are leading to 
different software in different countries. Rather, it’s increasingly hard 
for foreign internet programs to penetrate local markets as a structural 
matter. Russia, for instance, has blocked LinkedIn,47 is requiring local 
Russian apps to be loaded on all smartphones,48 and is indeed writing 
its own version of Wikipedia.49 Russia doesn’t like the fact that on 
 
 40. Melissa Etehad & Ramin Mostaghim, When Iran Blocked the Internet, Tech Experts in 
the U.S. Tried To Hack a Solution. Here’s Why They Couldn’t, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019, 3:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-12-17/iran-blocked-internet-tech-
experts-hack-solution [https://perma.cc/TG8A-KGCT].  
 41. Taylan Bilgic, Turkey’s Wikipedia Ban Violates Rights, Top Court Says, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 26, 2019, 4:43 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-26/turkey-s-
wikipedia-ban-violates-rights-top-court-says-anadolu [https://perma.cc/9ZAL-BQPG] (discuss-
ing Turkey’s ban on Wikipedia because the Turkish government didn’t like how its policies were 
described there, and noting previous Turkish bans on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook for 
political reasons). 
 42. Jeremy Malcolm, Malaysian Internet Censorship Is Going from Bad to Worse, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/malaysian-internet-
censorship-going-bad-worse [https://perma.cc/32G2-TPFR]. 
 43. Judge Orders Block of Facebook Throughout Brazil Over Parody Account, ACCESS NOW 
(Oct. 10, 2016, 6:01 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/judge-orders-block-facebook-throughout-
brazil-parody-account [https://perma.cc/9T6E-S6WK].  
 44. Vindu Goel & Salman Masood, Tech Giants Rebel Against Pakistan’s Censorship Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mumbai), Feb. 28, 2020, at B1. 
 45. For a discussion of internet shutdowns worldwide, see generally Giovanni de Gregorio 
& Nicola Stremlau, Internet Shutdowns and the Limits of Law, 14 INT’L J. COMM’N. 1 (2020). 
 46. Nancy Scola, Brazil Begins Laying Its Own Internet Cables To Avoid U.S. Surveillance, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2014/11/03/brazil-begins-laying-its-own-internet-cables-to-avoid-u-s-surveillance [https://perma. 
cc/R54U-YYCK]; Richard Kemeny, Brazil Is Sliding into Techno-Authoritarianism, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1007094/brazil-bolsonaro-
data-privacy-cadastro-base [https://perma.cc/9GHL-HV64]. 
 47. Sarah Rainsford, LinkedIn Blocked by Russian Authorities, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38014501 [https://perma.cc/ZP43-JQXM]. 
 48. Putin Signs Law Making Russian Apps Mandatory on Smartphones, Computers, 
REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2019, 12:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-internet-software/
putin-signs-law-making-russian-apps-mandatory-on-smartphones-computers-idUSKBN1Y61Z4 
[https://perma.cc/9459-AC2B]. 
 49. Victor Tangermann, Russia Says It Will Replace Wikipedia With State-Run Site, 
FUTURISM (Dec. 3, 2019), https://futurism.com/the-byte/russia-wikipedia-unreliable [https://
perma.cc/9U6D-6DST]. 
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Wikipedia just anybody could share information with the world. They 
want their citizens to see their government-vetted and approved 
information. China hasn’t written its own Wikipedia, but it has 
effectively achieved much the same result by banning Facebook and 
Google unless they complied with local censorship laws, which 
effectively kept them out of the country. China also encouraged the 
development of alternatives like Baidu and Tencent, which are, 
because they are Chinese, ultimately beholden to the Chinese 
government.  
It’s not just China and Russia banning foreign software, though. 
TikTok is the most popular social media app among young people.50 
But they may not be using it for long, at least in America, because the 
United States is on an active campaign to shut down TikTok because 
it is owned by a Chinese parent company.51 And if it’s owned by a 
Chinese parent company, the U.S. government fears they must secretly 
be spying on us.52 Now, I don’t know whether TikTok is, in fact, secretly 
spying on us.53 But I also don’t know that we should care. I’m not sure 
 
 50. TikTok has been downloaded over two billion times. See Jyoti Panday, The Hypocrisy 
of a U.S. TikTok Ban, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (July 28, 2020), https://
www.internetgovernance.org/2020/07/28/the-hypocrisy-of-a-u-s-tiktok-ban [https://perma.cc/
Z5DK-KEPN]. 
 51. Drew Harwell & Tony Romm, Inside TikTok: A Culture Clash Where U.S. Views About 
Censorship Often Were Overridden by the Chinese Bosses, WASH. POST. (Nov. 5, 2019, 4:38 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-us-
views-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses [https://perma.cc/K33U-EFQH] 
(noting censorship concerns but also pointing out that TikTok itself is based in the United States and 
doesn’t use Chinese moderators for its platform); Brian Fung & Jill Disis, Trump Administration 
Appeals Court Order Blocking TikTok Restrictions, CNN (Dec. 28, 2020, 9:43 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/12/28/tech/tiktok-federal-appeal-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/JW5A-
LL8L] (noting the Trump administration “appealed a decision handed down by a federal judge . . . 
that prevented authorities from fully implementing its restrictions against” TikTok). 
 52. See Neil Vigdor, U.S. Military Branches Block Access to TikTok App Amid Pentagon 
Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2Qois6N [https://perma.cc/E5YY-AT2K].  
 53. Many of these claims come from political rather than expert sources. See, e.g., Alyza 
Sebenius, TikTok App Merits National Security Investigation, Senators Say, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
24, 2019, 9:58 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-24/tiktok-app-merits-
national-security-investigation-senators-say [https://perma.cc/47R4-QD8U]. The actual technical 
evidence of TikTok collecting data from phones was consistent with collecting data in order to 
block spam, and the report found that virtually every large app was doing the same thing. See 
Talal Haj Bakry & Tommy Mysk, Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard, 
MYSK (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.mysk.blog/2020/03/10/popular-iphone-and-ipad-apps-
snooping-on-the-pasteboard [https://perma.cc/UW2F-YFD8]. And TikTok, unlike many U.S. 
apps, fixed the privacy bug when it was identified publicly. Id. 
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that if foreign intelligence agents actually saw everything Americans 
were doing on TikTok, they would gain much of great social value. Or 
perhaps the national-security apparatus cares more about our personal 
lives than we think. After all, the United States also barred Chinese 
ownership of the gay dating app Grindr on national-security grounds.54 
TikTok and Grindr illustrate a broader point—it’s not just 
authoritarian governments that are using balkanization to lock down 
the internet. The United States is responding in a number of cases by 
saying, “We don’t want foreign apps on our soil.” And it’s not just 
TikTok; the United States has also banned WeChat, the leading 
Chinese communications platform and one many Americans use to 
conduct business with China.55 It has prevented a Chinese company 
from acquiring a hotel management software company on “national 
security grounds.”56 And the FBI has taken the position that any 
mobile app from Russia is a “potential counterintelligence threat.”57 
Europe is in an interesting middle position because it doesn’t 
really have its own software companies,58 in part because of its less 
permissive attitude toward internet freedom.59 Most of the technology 
companies that developed did so in the United States. But Europe is 
 
TikTok collects data on its users, but note that many U.S. companies collect parallel sorts 
of data from their users. Id. TikTok may also respond to Chinese requests to censor content, but 
that’s a different objection.  
 54. Jay Peters, Grindr Has Been Sold by Its Chinese Owners After the US Expressed Security 
Concerns, VERGE (Mar. 6, 2020, 1:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/6/21168079/grindr-
sold-chinese-owner-us-cfius-security-concerns-kunlun-lgbtq [https://perma.cc/WP4N-5PJJ]. 
 55. Ana Swanson, David McCabe & Jack Nicas, Trump Administration To Ban TikTok and 
WeChat from U.S. App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3hIAN9l [https://
perma.cc/3VFY-Y4QR]. 
 56. David McLaughlin, Trump Blocks Chinese Deal for U.S. Software Firm StayNTouch, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-06/trump-
blocks-chinese-deal-for-hotel-management-software-company [https://perma.cc/HQ4P-BL8Q]. 
 57. Ben Brody, Russian Apps Could Be ‘Counterintelligence Threat,’ FBI Says, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 2, 2019, 2:00PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-02/russian-apps-
could-pose-counterintelligence-threat-fbi-warns [https://perma.cc/JCE2-QTPY]. 
 58. That may be changing. In response to the Trump administration and U.S. nationalism, 
Europe has “embarked on a generational project toward ‘digital sovereignty,’ mixing tougher 
rules against foreign tech companies with efforts to boost local innovation.” Steven Erlanger & 
Adam Satariano, In U.S. Tech Battle with China, Europe Feels Pinch, N.Y. TIMES (Brussels), Sept. 
12, 2020, at A10. 
 59. Cf. Josh Lerner & Greg Rafert, Lost in the Clouds: The Impact of Changing Property 
Rights on Investment in Cloud Computing Ventures (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 21140, 2015) (showing that investment in tech innovation increased in the United States and 
declined in Europe because of stricter European IP rules); Hall, supra note 27. 
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by some measures the largest market in the world.60 And as the United 
States increasingly abandons any pretense of global leadership, Europe 
increasingly controls the way U.S. companies work,61 in several 
different ways. Sometimes it does so by setting a standard that others 
follow—passing something like the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) on privacy, which then California copied in its 
new Privacy Act.62 Sometimes Europe prompts balkanization within a 
company, demanding geoblocking—in effect saying, “We don’t care 
what your U.S. consumers experience. Here is what everyone in 
Europe has to see.”63 Most problematic, sometimes it does so by 
insisting on imposing its rules worldwide. The GDPR rules, for 
instance, apply not just to European citizens, not just to transactions in 
Europe, but to any company that does any business with customers in 
Europe, which is almost any company.64  
Anu Bradford has gone so far as to say the European Union rules 
the world at this point, not because it is the most powerful—although 
it does currently have the largest economy—but because it has the 
regulatory will to use that economic power to try to tell other people 
what they have to do, at least in Europe.65  
Not only do people increasingly use different software and have 
different experiences in different countries, but even when they use the 
same software, it is often customized for location. And what that means 
increasingly is that the promise of the internet—that we get to 
communicate with people, we get to share information and experiences 
with people all around the world—is being cut short. The news you see, 
the facts you see, and even the maps you see change depending on 
where you are.66 That may be because they’re being produced by 
different companies. Or it may be that the same global company is 
 




 61. Id. at xiii–xiv, 99-101. 
 62. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (2018). 
 63. See generally Yu, supra note 26 (discussing geoblocking). 
 64. See Keller, supra note 32, at 290. 
 65. BRADFORD, supra note 30, at 25–65.  
 66. David Yanofsky, See How Borders Change on Google Maps Depending on Where You 
View Them, QUARTZ (June 23, 2014), https://qz.com/224821/see-how-borders-change-on-google-
maps-depending-on-where-you-view-them [https://perma.cc/H7JS-5E38].  
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giving different information to different people in different countries 
because their governments demand it.67  
B. Nationalizing Hardware Networks 
But it’s not just software. Increasingly, hardware is itself being 
nationalized. Now, some of this is market division. The iPhone is the 
dominant device in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Switzerland, 
and Japan. But those are the only countries in which the iPhone is the 
dominant phone. In the rest of the world, some phone from the 
Android ecosystem is the dominant phone, and iPhone shares are 
actually quite small. Indeed, the iPhone has less than one-third of the 
overall market.68  
That could be consumer choice—iPhones cost more than a lot of 
Android phones, so maybe they’re more likely to be purchased in rich 
countries. But that’s not all of it. In most of Europe, the iPhone is not 
dominant.69  
The fact that different countries use different phone hardware is 
going to become an increasingly significant problem. The United States 
is currently in the process of banning Chinese phones from the market. 
The government views Huawei and ZTE phone technology as a 
security risk, much like TikTok.70 The U.S. government is trying to 
keep them out of the U.S. market altogether.71 And it is pushing 
 
 67. Facebook engages in geotargeting, for instance. About Location Targeting, Business 
Help Center, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/202297959811696 
[https://perma.cc/SM8E-YAJ7]. 
 68. See Android v iOS Market Share 2019, DEVICEATLAS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://
deviceatlas.com/blog/android-v-ios-market-share [https://perma.cc/QVR7-3B23] (finding that 
most countries prefer Android); Samsung Reclaims the Top Spot as Smartphone Market Performs 
Better Than Expected with 353.6 Million Device Shipments in 3Q20, According to IDC, IDC (Oct. 
29, 2020), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS46974920 [https://perma.cc/D2VS-
GR47]. 
 69. Id. The United Kingdom is no longer in the European Union, unfortunately. U.K. Leaves 
E.U., Embarking on an Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2OggOCT  
[https://perma.cc/J7G7-PG7T]. 
 70. See Katie Collins, Pentagon Bans Sale of Huawei, ZTE Phones on US Military Bases, 
CNET (May 2, 2018, 5:54 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/pentagon-reportedly-bans-sale-of-
huawei-and-zte-phones-on-us-military-bases [https://perma.cc/6J6Y-WU6C]; Todd Shields, 
FCC Calls Huawei, ZTE Security Threats as It Bars Subsidies, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2020, 4:37 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-30/fcc-designates-china-s-huawei-
zte-as-national-security-threats [https://perma.cc/9JMP-7DUT]. 
 71. Shields, supra note 70.  
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Europe—so far, unsuccessfully—to ban Chinese phone technology as 
well.72 The United States won’t even let Huawei use American 
technology to build its phones.73 It grounded its entire fleet of drones 
because they had Chinese parts in them.74 It has even objected to the 
presence of Huawei router equipment on private land sufficiently near 
a U.S. military base. We not only don’t want Huawei phones or 
technology in the United States or on U.S. military bases, but we don’t 
want them within a certain geographic range around a U.S. military 
base.75 The U.S. attorney general has even proposed nationalizing 
(foreign) cell-phone makers to create a U.S. counterweight to 
Huawei.76 There may be legitimate security concerns with Huawei 
phones, though there is disagreement on that score.77 But this reaction 
seems quite extreme. 
It’s not just cell-phone makers. As part of this policy, the United 
States is affirmatively engaged in a mercantilist battle to try to promote 
Qualcomm and Qualcomm’s chips over alternatives. The U.S. 
government filed a brief challenging the Federal Trade Commission—
a different branch of the U.S. government—essentially saying, “We 
have to let Qualcomm hold on to a monopoly on chips, even though 
 
 72. Iain Rogers, Pompeo Tells Germany To Tackle China or Lose Data Sharing, 
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2019, 8:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-31/
pompeo-tells-germany-to-tackle-china-or-lose-data-sharing [https://perma.cc/WHH2-BQ4D]. 
 73. Ana Swanson, U.S. Delivers Another Blow to Huawei, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:33 
AM), https://nyti.ms/3cC57QX [https://perma.cc/24K6-RQGL]. 
 74. Well, the civilian government drones, anyway. Lisa Friedman & David McCabe, Interior 
Dept. Halts Drones Over Worries About China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://nyti.ms/
38TvKPj [https://perma.cc/J3S9-2ZD2]. Apparently, U.S. killer drones with Chinese parts are still 
OK. 
 75. Todd Shields, Alyza Sebenius & Scott Moritz, FCC Wants To Know if Huawei Gear Is Near 
U.S. Military Bases, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-11-05/fcc-wants-to-know-if-huawei-gear-is-near-u-s-military-bases [https://perma.cc/
WJ6P-FGH3]. 
 76. Mark Hosenball & David Brunnstrom, To Counter Huawei, U.S. Could Take 
‘Controlling Stake’ in Ericsson, Nokia: Attorney General, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:03 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/-idUSKBN2001DL [https://perma.cc/SH8Z-2PA6]. 
 77. Compare Angelina Rascouet, Eyk Henning, Nabila Ahmed & Thomas Pfeiffer, Phone 
Firms Fearing Huawei Crackdown Say 5G Risks Are Overblown, BNA TECH. & TELECOMM. L. 
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X96LP4FC000000 
[https://perma.cc/WR75-NA9N] (quoting executives from Verizon and Ericsson who assert 5G is 
more secure than its 4G and 3G predecessors), with Patrick Donahue, German Spy Chief Says 
Huawei Can’t Be ‘Fully Trusted’ in 5G, BNA TECH. & TELECOMM. L. NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019, 10:59 
AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X5JTSQOK000000 [https://perma.cc/6LWG-
CCHB] (noting a lack of trust due to Huawei’s dependence on the Communist Party and China’s 
intelligence apparatus). 
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they’re violating the antitrust laws, because to do otherwise would 
violate national security.”78 If we let anybody but Qualcomm build the 
chips, the Justice Department reasoned, who knows what’s going to be 
in those chips? They could have spyware or back doors built in that 
would give the Chinese government access to information passed 
through the chips.79 The U.S. government has sought to block other 
semiconductor mergers on “national security” grounds.80 
This isn’t just an objection to Chinese technology. The Trump 
administration also refused to allow Broadcom to buy Qualcomm 
because Broadcom is based in Singapore.81 Again, the reasoning was 
nationalistic. Right now, the theory seems to be, the United States 
would have ultimate control over Qualcomm because they’re based in 
the United States.82 But if they’re based in Singapore, who knows what 
could happen? The Singaporean government could impose restrictions 
or requirements on what the merged company does. Conversely, and 
not incidentally, the United States would be less able to insert its own 
back doors into the chips or impose requirements.  
Nor is nationalization limited to the United States and China. 
India has barred a variety of Chinese mobile apps, including TikTok.83 
The United States has been lobbying Europe to do the same thing, 
even threatening to cut off data sharing with Europe if they don’t cut 
 
 78. See Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and 
Vacatur at 32–34, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-
16122).  
 79. See id.; see also Katie Benner, China’s Command of 5G Is a ‘Danger,’ Barr Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2020, at B7 (“The White House and American national security experts have said 
that companies including Huawei are too closely tied to the Chinese government, and that their 
equipment could give Chinese officials unlawful access to data and communications if networks 
across the world decide to use it.”). 
 80. Saleha Moshin, David McLaughlin & Jenny Leonard, Trump Advised To Halt Infineon Deal 
Amid China Security Risk, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-03-05/trump-is-warned-on-security-risk-from-infineon-deal-for-cypress [https://perma.cc/
MT2P-VP38]. 
 81. Michael Leiter, Ivan Schlager & Donald Vieira, Broadcom’s Blocked Acquisition of 
Qualcomm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2018/04/03/broadcoms-blocked-acquisition-of-qualcomm [https://perma.cc/9LRX-D8YJ].  
 82. Daniel Liberto, Why Did Trump Block Broadcom’s Bid for Qualcomm?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/why-did-trump-block-broadcoms-bid-
qualcomm [https://perma.cc/F3K3-E5J4]. 
 83. Maria Abi-Habib, India Bans Chinese Mobile Apps Like Tik-Tok, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2020, at B5. 
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off Chinese companies,84 and it has persuaded the United Kingdom to 
ban Huawei.85 
This isn’t something that’s going to go unanswered. If the United 
States says to China, “Sorry, none of your companies can participate in 
building phones for the next generation,” or if we say to Singapore, 
“Sorry, none of your companies can participate in building chips to go 
in those phones,” other countries will do something similar in 
response.86  
It’s not at all clear the United States would win such a competition. 
China is building a 5G network, and it’s not just building it in China. 
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it’s building that network in 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia as well.87 Those countries will use a 
5G network that may well be incompatible with the U.S. 5G network 
because we are building different hardware systems that don’t 
necessarily talk to each other.88 And even if data can pass between the 
networks, it will increasingly be on software platforms that are nation 
specific. The United States may ban TikTok, but that doesn’t mean the 
rest of the world will; relatively few of those two billion downloads are 
American teenagers.89 
 
 84. Rogers, supra note 72. 
 85. Kitty Donaldson & Thomas Seal, UK Says Only Matter of Time Before Huawei Exits 5G 
Network, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-
30/u-k-s-dowden-says-matter-of-time-before-huawei-exits-5g-network [https://perma.cc/9D2E-6FBS]. 
 86. I don’t mean to suggest that the United States is the only or the worst offender. China 
has been discouraging U.S. tech companies from doing business in China for many years. Paige 
Leskin, Here Are All the Major US Tech Companies Blocked Behind China’s ‘Great Firewall,’ 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2019, 12:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/major-us-tech-
companies-blocked-from-operating-in-china-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/XRU8-R867].  
 87. Emily Feng, China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much of the Globe Despite U.S. Efforts To 
Ban It, NPR (Oct. 24, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-
huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-s-efforts-to-ban-it [https://perma.cc/5UW9-V8TH]; Paul 
Nantulya, Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt One Road Strategy, AFR. CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC STUD. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-
one-belt-one-road-strategy [https://perma.cc/YC9L-AXYV]; Zhang, supra note 20. 
 88. Benner, supra note 79; Nic Fildes, Can the 5G Network Be Secured Against Spying?, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/423e8406-3920-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 
[https://perma.cc/3236-EZL3] (“One of the biggest issues for the telecoms industry is the 
dominance of giants like Huawei, whose technology is very hardware-centric and incompatible 
with other vendors’ technology.”). 
 89. See Mansoor Iqbal, TikTok Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. APPS (Oct. 15, 
2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics [https://perma.cc/AT8N-M9AL]. 
TikTok has 500 to 800 million active users. Id. “Only 9% of US internet users have used TikTok, 
with 5% more interested in using it; this rises to 49% for teenage users.” Id. 
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This incompatibility is something we used to have in the early days 
of cell phones—GSM versus CDMA technologies.90 It’s something we 
used to have in the early days of software. You couldn’t actually read 
files from an Apple if you were on a Windows computer and vice versa. 
Technical incompatibility is something we’ve gotten away from, to 
everyone’s benefit. It looks like we’re moving back to a world where 
what you can see and who you can talk to is a function of what software 
and hardware you use. And that, in turn, increasingly will depend on 
where you live. 
Some of this nationalism is justified by worries about foreign 
spying, but I think it’s at least as much justified—both in the United 
States and in China—by a desire for domestic spying.91 While we rightly 
worry about China, the United States has a pretty comprehensive 
electronic surveillance infrastructure in place.92 Anybody remember 
Ed Snowden? We’ve had sufficient shocks in the world in the past five 
years that we kind of forgot about that one. But the United States has 
built and is trying to expand quite a significant electronic surveillance 
mechanism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has, on 
several occasions—including, most recently, this year93—tried to 
prevent private companies within the United States from engaging in 
effective encryption. They’ve tried to block Facebook from doing end-
to-end encryption on WhatsApp.94 They have tried to force Apple to 
put a back door into its phone so that when something bad happens, 
 
 90. GSM refers to “global system for mobile communications,” while CDMA refers to 
“code-division multiple access technology.” 
 91. See Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 738 (2015). 
 92. See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes-Explainer, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer [https://perma.cc/8CX2-LSHR]; 
Ryan Gallagher & Henrik Moltke, The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. 
Cities, INTERCEPT (June 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsa-spy-
hubs [https://perma.cc/3K2U-2RH5]. 
 93. See Jon Brodkin, Apple Cut Backup End-to-End Encryption Plans After FBI 
Complained, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 21, 2020, 12:43 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/
01/apple-reportedly-nixed-plan-for-end-to-end-encryption-in-iphone-backups [https://perma.cc/
LK93-JFGM]. 
 94. See Zak Doffman, U.S. May Outlaw Messaging Encryption Used by Whatsapp, iMessage 
and Others, Report, FORBES (June 29, 2019, 1:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/
2019/06/29/u-s-may-outlaw-uncrackable-end-to-end-encrypted-messaging-report-claims [https://
perma.cc/RSG2-FLVJ]. 
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the FBI has the ability to unlock that phone.95 That’s a battle that has 
been going on for a long time. The few people in the room as old as me 
might remember the Clipper chip of 1995, which was the last time the 
U.S. government said, “We need to build a back door in the internet 
so that the FBI can see and read everything you’re doing.”96  
If we are worried about foreign surveillance of our citizens on the 
internet, I think at most what we could say is not that we don’t do it, or 
that we do it less, but that historically, pervasive U.S. communication 
software surveillance has been used in the service of a less repressive 
agenda here than it has elsewhere. I hope that will remain true, but I’m 
not sure that it will.  
And at a minimum, even if you still trust your government to 
always do the right thing, the rest of the world doesn’t. And that means 
that if we’re going to insist on U.S. chips with U.S. surveillance built in, 
and China is going to insist on Chinese chips with Chinese surveillance 
built in, other companies and countries are not automatically going to 
choose the United States as the lesser of two evils.  
The software differences are bad enough. But once internet 
hardware is country specific, this becomes harder and harder to undo. 
And mobile devices are built to operate with their national networks. 
Chinese phones work with Chinese software apps in China; U.S. 
phones work with U.S. software apps in the United States. It’s easier. 
It’s more logical to optimize the software for that hardware—that is, to 
run different, incompatible software systems because they work best 
with others in the same country, which is, after all, who we 
communicate with most of the time. We’re not just experiencing 
different things on the same network. Increasingly, our devices may not 
be capable of interoperating or even seeing the same things.  
C. Nationalizing the Network Itself 
Even the backbone of the internet itself is not immune from 
balkanization. There are increasing moves by companies and internet 
 
 95. Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On, WIRED 
(Feb. 18, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-complicated-heres-
whats-really-going-on [https://perma.cc/CDY3-253F].  
 96. See Tim Matthews, The Clipper Chip: How Once upon a Time the Government Wanted 
To Put a Backdoor in Your Phone, EXABEAM: INFO. SEC. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://
www.exabeam.com/information-security/clipper-chip [https://perma.cc/3B3N-VLLX]. For a 
discussion of these proposed “exceptional-access mandates,” see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Wicked 
Crypto, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1181, 1198–99 (2019). 
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service providers (“ISPs”) to filter malicious sites at the domain-name-
system (“DNS”) level so that they are never accessible at all, even on 
your server system.97 Not that you just don’t see them on your device. 
Your corporate server never sees them either. The DNS routing system 
pretends that site on the internet simply doesn’t exist. If you try to send 
a message to it, you will not get a response.  
Preventing malicious sites seems like a good idea. But the 
definition of “malicious sites” depends on your perspective. It could be 
and often is cybersecurity hacking, phishing scams, and the like. But 
porn, or democracy in Hong Kong, or sites that encourage voting by 
mail, could all be viewed as malicious sites, depending on who is 
deciding which parts of the internet you get to see.  
Other ISPs insert their own advertising for nonexistent pages. If I 
try to search for a page that doesn’t exist, the ISP pretends there’s a 
page there and fills it with advertising.98 They may do the same for 
pages filtered off the internet. The U.S. government did the same thing 
when it “seized” internet domain names for alleged IP infringement, 
changing the pointer in the routing system to the Justice Department 
web site.99 And of course, hackers try to attack the internet routing 
system altogether, substituting a malicious page for the one the system 
expects to find. All these efforts fragment the reality we see, so that 
what I see at rojadirecta.com is not what you see there. 
Even the very backbone of the internet—this DNS routing 
system—is fragile and potentially subject to government manipulation. 
The DNS system that makes it work is literally controlled by fourteen 
people who hold seven sets of keys.100 They’re sort of the early 
blockchain. If they all agree, this must be a canonical DNS router. If 
someone can change that—if those computers change their DNS entry 
 
 97. See How Does DNS Filtering Work?, WEBTITAN (Aug. 30, 2019), https://
www.spamtitan.com/web-filtering/how-does-dns-filtering-work [https://perma.cc/R4TZ-5ZJW]. 
 98. Cf. Advertising Policies Help: AdSense for Domains Trademark Complaint, GOOGLE, https://
support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/50003?hl=en [https://perma.cc/N3WV-VTDV] (demonstrating 
that Google can display ads on pages with inactive domain names). 
 99. See Nate Anderson, Government Admits Defeat, Gives Back Seized Rojadirecta 
Domains, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2012, 4:23 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/
government-goes-0-2-admits-defeat-in-rojadirecta-domain-forfeit-case/ [https://perma.cc/Q8NG-
4XMD] (discussing examples of government IP-related domain-name seizures). Full disclosure: I 
represented Rojadirecta in this case. 
 100. Julie Bort, The Internet Is Actually Controlled by 14 People Who Hold 7 Secret Keys, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2014, 6:15 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-internet-is-
controlled-by-14-people-2014-3 [https://perma.cc/UH92-KS9J]. 
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or even if they start to disagree—we no longer see the same things on 
the internet. That’s different than blocking a website. Someone with 
control over a DNS server can literally create their own version of the 
internet that everyone who relies on that server will assume is the 
canonical one.101  
The internet has always been international and global. In part, 
though, that’s an accident of history. The United States was the de 
facto custodian of the internet because the companies that 
administered the backbone happened to be located here, because it 
was first built here.102 And we have traditionally been the laissez-faire 
country when it comes to the internet. But that effective freedom is 
changing. The DNS system is not officially a U.S. phenomenon. And 
even unofficially, our de facto control over the DNS system is 
shrinking. We passed control from the U.S. government to a private, 
nonprofit organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) a couple of decades ago.  
ICANN is based in the United States, so it is nominally subject to 
U.S. law. ICANN is a dubious custodian of DNS.103 Most recently, it 
considered (and thankfully rejected) selling “.org,” the nonprofit top-
level domain, for $1 billion to for-profit companies who will 
presumably then not do anything profit making with it.104  
But even if you thought ICANN was fine, many countries are 
pushing to take control of the backbone away from the United States 
altogether, putting it in the hands of the United Nations through the 
International Telecommunications Union or, more likely, giving each 
country control of its own top-level domain.105 Under this approach, 
 
 101. See Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 34.  
 102. See generally Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, 
Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, Brief 
History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y (1997), https://www.internetsociety.org/internet/history-
internet/brief-history-internet [https://perma.cc/YX8K-C6Z4] (summarizing the development of 
the early stages of the internet). 
 103. For an older but detailed analysis, see generally A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. 
Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
 104. See Timothy B. Lee, ICANN Blocks Controversial Sale of .org Domain to Private Equity 
Firm, ARSTECHNICA (May 1, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/05/icann-
blocks-controversial-sale-of-org-domain-to-a-private-equity-firm [https://perma.cc/NE9L-MS87]. 
 105. Bryan Lynn, Did the US Just ‘Give Away’ Control of the Internet?, VOA LEARNING ENG. 
(Oct. 03, 2016), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/did-the-us-government-just-give-away-
control-of-the-internet-to-icann/3535200.html [https://perma.cc/6DYS-97WQ]; Some Governments 
Want More Control Over the Internet via ITU, EDRI (Aug. 29, 2012), https://edri.org/our-work/
edrigramnumber10-16itu-debates-internet-regulation [https://perma.cc/7937-M4GV]. 
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the U.K. government would have control over the parts of the DNS 
server that point to “.uk” and the like. Doing that would make political 
shutdowns or diversions to alternate realities a lot easier. And indeed, 
various countries—including, unfortunately, the United States—have 
made efforts to interfere with DNS routing for political purposes. 
Internet shutdowns in Iran and Turkey were done by basically 
rerouting or turning off the outside world’s access to the country’s top-
level domain.106  
In the United States, nearly a decade ago, we proposed the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and the PROTECT IP Act (“PIPA”) 
that would have enforced U.S. copyright law by literally making the 
sites that infringe invisible to the world.107 The DNS servers simply 
would not return a result, and any ISP would be forced to pretend to 
you that those sites didn’t exist—not tell you they’re infringing, not 
take down the sites, but pretend that they did not exist at all.108  
SOPA and PIPA died because an unprecedented number of 
internet users rose up against it en masse to protect the internet.109 But 
I’m not sure that people have the same love for the internet in 2020 
that they did in 2011. The next time a government (perhaps ours) 
decides to divert people away from the site they tried to visit to one the 
government thinks they should visit, the public might not be there to 
stop them. And the U.S. risk comes not just from copyright owners, but 
from an increasingly authoritarian—and desperate—Trump 
administration.110 
III.  THE INTERNET IS WORTH SAVING 
The result, I think, is that we’re losing the internet. We’re 
replacing it with “the splinternet,” a balkanized set of computer 
 
 106. DIGITAL PLANET, Iran Internet Shutdown Continues, BBC (Nov. 24, 2019, 8:32 PM), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3csy676 [https://perma.cc/MX6W-5QX2]; Internet Shutdown in 
Turkey’s Southeast Following Mayor’s Detention, TURK. BLOCKS (Oct. 26, 2016), https://
turkeyblocks.org/2016/10/26/internet-shutdown-turkey-diyarbakir [https://perma.cc/J8SP-ST69].  
 107. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 34. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Alex Fitzpatrick, The Week That Killed SOPA: A Timeline, MASHABLE (Jan. 20, 2012), https://
mashable.com/2012/01/20/sopa-is-dead-timeline-january-blackout [https://perma.cc/MBX5-P9HC]. 
 110. See Tom Wheeler, Could Donald Trump Claim a National Security Threat To Shut Down 
the Internet?, BROOKINGS (June 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/06/25/
could-donald-trump-claim-a-national-security-threat-to-shut-down-the-internet [https://perma.
cc/MF58-CVAT]. 
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protocols that increasingly differs by company and by country. That’s 
not a good thing.  
Now, you might not like some aspects of the internet. Some 
aspects of the internet are pretty horrible. Different countries may 
disagree about what’s wrong with it. They may want to regulate it in 
different ways; they may want it to do different things.111 But the 
internet has improved the world in all kinds of ways. Some of those are 
economic. The internet access industry alone generates a trillion 
dollars a year,112 and that doesn’t account for the commerce the 
internet makes possible.  
The internet has also changed our lives for the better. Our phones 
improve our lives in ways we don’t think about because we’re not lost 
in a foreign country where we don’t speak the language. We have a 
map that will get us where we want to go. We’re not stuck on the 
highway with a flat tire and no way to communicate to anyone about 
that fact. We’re not sitting in a restaurant waiting for a friend who 
canceled or debating some arcane fact with our friends without a device 
in our pocket capable of accessing all of the world’s information.  
For most of my lifetime, you did not take those things for granted. 
These are things that became available because we have access to this 
intersecting universe of information. Many of those benefits involve 
connection. They depend on the ability of systems to work together 
across multiple countries, across multiple languages. That’s why the 
internet, and not a walled garden like Prodigy or CompuServe, is the 
thing we use today.  
Balkanization means it’s harder for people to share experiences 
across countries. Paul Ohm and Jack Goldsmith have argued that’s a 
good thing, because we want different countries to have different rules, 
and those countries should be able to regulate the internet, just as they 
should be able to regulate any other part of their world.113 But I think 
we lose something real when we splinter the internet. Doing so takes 
away the ability to see what the rest of the world has, how the rest of 
 
 111. See generally ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD (2013) (arguing for 
harmonization wherever possible but acceptance of different regional rules governing internet 
behavior). 
 112. The Global Internet Access Market Had Total Revenues of $981.4bn in 2016, CISION 
(Nov. 9, 2017, 4:04 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-global-internet-access-
market-had-total-revenues-of-9814bn-in-2016-300553419.html [https://perma.cc/H7UP-EJ7C]. 
 113. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD viii (2008); Daskal & Ohm, supra note 36, at 21. 
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the world thinks, and that’s a loss. I think it’s a loss for everyone, but 
it’s a particular loss for people in repressive regimes who can look to 
the outside world for hope, for inspiration to demand change, and for 
the means of facilitating that change. If we take that away by allowing 
repressive governments to control how their citizens see the internet, 
we take away the prospect of freedom for a substantial number of 
people.  
The internet famously enabled democratic uprisings in the Arab 
Spring.114 But splintering the internet also means it’s easier for 
repressive governments to shut down outside access altogether—as 
Belarus,115 Iran, and Turkey have done recently, and as India has done 
in Kashmir during its crackdown on minority groups. And even if they 
don’t shut down the internet altogether, those countries will end up 
with much more significant control over the companies who are 
providing the information to you if those companies are local.116  
The global nature of internet companies has mitigated that risk to 
some extent. If China wants to censor Google, Google can tell China 
to pound sand, and it did.117 Medium can tell Malaysia to pound sand, 
and it did when it was told to censor content that Malaysia didn’t like.118 
Baidu can’t do the same with China because Baidu is in China. And an 
Iranian-based internet company or a Russian version of Wikipedia 
shouldn’t be expected to offer much resistance to the demands of the 
nations where they are based.119 
 
 114. Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (“Across the world, 
dissidents have used the web to circulate information, relying on offshore servers to avoid local 
repression.”). 
 115. See Ryan Gallagher, Belarusian Officials Shut Down Internet with Technology Made 
by U.S. Firm, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-08-28/belarusian-officials-shut-down-internet-with-technology-made-by-u-s-firm 
[https://perma.cc/UTH4-SW2M]. 
 116. Chander & Le, supra note 91, at 735 (“The end result of data localization is to bring 
information increasingly under the control of the local authorities . . . .”). 
 117. Kaveh Waddell, Why Google Quit China – And Why It’s Heading Back, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/why-google-quit-china-and-
why-its-heading-back/424482 [https://perma.cc/3PG5-BNBS] (discussing Google’s decision to 
withdraw from China in 2010). 
 118. Why Has Malaysia Blocked Medium?, ENGADGET (Jan. 28, 2016), https://
www.engadget.com/2016-01-28-malaysia-medium-block-explainer.html [https://perma.cc/4NJC-
5BBV]. 
 119. Some, but not all, U.S. companies pushed back against unlawful surveillance by the U.S. 
government during the Bush and Obama administrations. Elias Groll, How American Companies 
Enable NSA Surveillance, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:40 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/
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Nationalized surveillance-enabled systems aren’t just enabling 
government repression. They’re also a cyber-security nightmare. 
Collect all of the sensitive data about what people are saying, what 
they’re doing, what their accounts look like in a government system, 
and that government system will be hacked. I guarantee it. The more 
valuable the data the government collects, the bigger the target its 
database will be. And we’ve built not just our political and our social 
polity and conversation into the internet, we’ve built many of our most 
important systems around the internet backbone. Your banks, your 
power companies, various things that we depend on for the 
infrastructure of modern civilization are built into a network that we 
are increasingly making a nationalized, hackable, surveilled system. 
And the idea that governments—U.S. or foreign—will have more 
control over them is troubling.  
The worst thing to me about the splintering of the internet is that 
I think the way we’re losing the internet parallels the way we’re losing 
the project of globalization. Globalization sometimes gets a bad rap,120 
but for me, it is something valuable. And we are replacing globalization 
with a particularly authoritarian form of tribalism in countries around 
the world: in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, 
India, Brazil, Turkey, Hungary, and the Philippines.121 In country after 
country, the future seems to lie not in reaching out and interacting with 
the world around you, but in autarkies. Countries are drawing 
boundaries around their race, their nationality, their religion, and so 
forth. The splintering of the internet reflects that retreat from 
globalization, but it may also make it harder to undo. One possible 
mechanism for unifying the internet—international law and 
international norms—seems less promising than it would be in a world 




But the United States is (hopefully still) not a repressive government.  
 120. John Rennie Short, Column: Why There’s a Backlash Against Globalization and What 
Needs To Change, PBS (Nov. 30, 2016, 5:36 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/
column-theres-backlash-globalization-needs-change [https://perma.cc/J5S8-SLBK]. 
 121. See, e.g., Martin Wolf, The Rise of the Populist Authoritarians, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/4faf6c4e-1d84-11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d [https://perma.cc/6636-GUWJ]. 
 122. See generally JEFFREY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2007) (arguing that a populist retreat from global trade at the beginning 
of the twentieth century eliminated the shared interests that otherwise staved off war, leading to 
World War I, World War II, and the Cold War). 
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IV.  WHAT CAN WE DO? 
That brings me to the last part of the speech, the part where I tell 
you how to solve the problem. Unfortunately, I don’t have great ideas. 
Nonetheless, here are four suggestions.  
First, we should promote technologies that are resilient to 
government censorship. End-to-end encryption of phones and 
messaging is a good start. We ought to be building it into all of our 
systems, and we ought to be using systems only if they are, in fact, 
encrypted. Encryption and blockchain-based technologies can allow 
persistent pseudonymity, so that people can actually interact with a 
verifiable person without having to identify them and know who they 
are.123 VPNs—or “Virtual Private Networks”—can allow tunneling 
through national firewalls to give you access to other people’s internet 
experiences.124 We need to protect and promote these technologies, not 
undermine them. People can use them to avoid censorship in countries 
that engage in software filtering.125 That means we need to fight 
government efforts to introduce back doors wherever we can, not just 
when China imposes them, but when the United States tries to impose 
them on Apple phones as well.  
Right now, many of these technologies are fringe. If you use 
blockchain—or peer-to-peer networks, back in the day—the 
assumption is that there’s probably something wrong with you. Maybe 
you’re a drug dealer or you’re engaged in copyright piracy or 
something. We often associate these fringe technologies with criminals, 
simply because we haven’t developed a mainstream tradition of using 
them. And without widespread legitimate use, much of the early use of 
these technologies is indeed by criminals.126  
But that conclusion isn’t inevitable. The same thing was once said 
of secured-sockets-layer (“SSL”) encryption. Indeed, the United 
States tried to block encryption from being built into the internet back 
 
 123. Block Chains Aren’t Anonymous. But They Can Be, LEDGEROPS, https://ledgerops.com/
blog/blockchains-arent-anonymous-but-they-can-be-05-01-2019 [https://perma.cc/D6J8-SU66]. 
 124. Paul Ohm refers to VPNs as a technology of balkanization, Daskal & Ohm, supra note 
36, at 20, but I think, in practice, that has it backwards—it is a technology that allows many to 
evade censorship by skirting geoblocking restrictions.  
 125. VPNs may have a harder time getting around a coming regime of hardware surveillance. 
 126. Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Tālis J. Putniņš, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much 
Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1798, 1800 (2019).  
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in 1995.127 Now it’s standard. You wouldn’t want to give your credit 
card number to somebody, much less bank with them, if they didn’t 
actually have a secure transaction with robust encryption. What was 
once considered a dangerous fringe technology that was going to allow 
criminals to get away with all sorts of stuff is now something so 
standard that we get nervous if a website doesn’t have it. The same 
could turn out to be true of end-to-end encryption or blockchain if 
mainstream sites adopt them widely enough. 
Widespread adoption of these technologies of connection makes 
balkanization harder. And at a minimum, countries that hope to 
protect the internet shouldn’t be making them illegal, either directly or 
through regulation via indirect devices like copyright 
anticircumvention.128 The law should resist the inference that you’re 
facilitating a bad act by being anonymous or encrypted, and so we need 
to stop you. Unfortunately, the U.S. government often takes that 
position, and it has restricted the deployment of freedom-enhancing 
technologies like end-to-end encryption.129 
Second, individuals ought to resist hyper-personalization in the 
private market. We ought to be troubled by device and software 
specialization by private companies for some of the same reasons we 
resist balkanization by countries. Google, Tencent, Apple, and others 
want to keep you in their ecosystem.130 They want to send you from 
their search engine to their pet systems, their apps, and their devices, 
because the longer they can keep you in the ecosystem, the more 
information they can learn about you and the more opportunities they 
have to sell you things. So they are closing Applications Programming 
Interfaces (“APIs”) and making it harder for independent companies 
to write software that works with their ecosystems.131 
 
 127. See Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994), https://
www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html [https://perma.cc/YL5J-
XLSU] (discussing concerns about the effort to surveil communications online via the Clipper 
Chip); Matthews, supra note 96 (discussing the Clipper Chip). 
 128. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2018) (establishing liability for circumventing access restrictions on 
copyrighted works). 
 129. See Brodkin, supra note 93. 
 130. See Chris Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 839–40 (2019) (noting that Amazon, Apple, and Google all offer 
exclusive access to products in their ecosystem to those who use their home speaker products).  
 131. Daskal & Ohm, supra note 36, at 20 (“[T]he Internet has been horribly Balkanized by 
corporations at the app layer.”); Chinmayi Sharma, Concentrated Digital Markets, Restrictive 
APIs, and the Fight for Internet Interoperability, 50 U. MEM. L. REV. 441, 442 (2019) 
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Venture outside. Don’t use software only from your country. 
Don’t use software all from the same company. Resisting the walled 
gardens at the private level helps preserve the internet and prevents it 
from devolving back into AOL or Compuserve.  
Third, the law should promote interoperability across walled 
gardens. One way to do this is to encourage open APIs both as a 
business and a legal matter. Another way is open-source or free 
software. The law shouldn’t mandate free software, but it should allow 
what Cory Doctorow calls “adversarial interoperability.”132 
Companies want to create walled gardens. They want to regulate 
who can see in over the wall, who can get access to that information. 
The law has not traditionally let them,133 but a number of legal tools, 
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and copyright law, have 
been used increasingly to try to prevent interoperability.134 Those laws 
threaten to prevent competitors from making a software program that, 
 
(“[Unfortunately, these] platforms have begun closing off access to information and features by 
restricting APIs.”). 
 132. See Cory Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/adversarial-interoperability [https://perma.cc/2Y6G-WNR8].  
 133. See, e.g., DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Tech. Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996); Sega Enter. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. 
v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843–44 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software 
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988); Mitel Inc. v. Iqtel Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1050, 1054–55 (D. Colo. 
1995); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual 
Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1995); Pamela 
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software 
Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1297 (2017); Joseph P. Gratz & Mark A. 
Lemley, Platforms and Interoperability in Oracle v. Google, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 603, 605 
(2018) (“Software copyright law has long favored interoperability. In many cases it has done so 
by denying protection altogether to elements of computer programs that exist only for purposes 
of interoperability, like APIs.”). See generally JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, 
INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL 
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1995) (discussing the court fights over interoperability). Still other courts 
have found interoperability to be fair use. See, e.g., Sega Enter. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 
(9th Cir. 1992), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993); Sony Comput. Ent., 
Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 134. See generally Google v. Oracle, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (adopting a broad reading 
of copyright to prevent interoperability); United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 
2019) (adopting a broad reading of CFAA); Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1453 (2016) (discussing the abuse of the CFAA). The Supreme Court at this writing is set 
to consider the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Van Buren v. United States, No. 
19-783 (U.S. 2020), and the permissibility of interoperability in software copyright, Google v. 
Oracle, No. 18-956 (U.S. 2019). 
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say, allows Facebook users to share their data across Facebook and 
other platforms. That preserves incumbents by making it harder to 
build an alternative to Facebook. That is especially true in markets 
with significant network effects.135  
Now, there are arguably good reasons why you want to prevent 
some sharing of data from incumbent platforms. One justification is 
privacy—people don’t necessarily want the data they share with 
Facebook passed on to other companies without Facebook’s 
consent.136 Although I have to say that the idea that Facebook is out 
there protecting your privacy by preventing you from using a cross-
platform app—which they successfully did in Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
Ventures, Inc.137—is a bit far-fetched to me.  
But lack of open interfaces means concentration of private 
economic power. It means we all end up having to choose a single 
system. And in a market with strong network effects, that generally 
means all or most of us use the same system. And that, in turn, creates 
a central choke point governments can target.  
That leads me to my fourth recommendation, which is we ought 
to be looking for mechanisms to promote vibrant competition in 
internet platforms. As Andrew McCreary and I explain in our paper, 
“Exit Strategy,”138 we no longer see the sort of Schumpeterian 
competition that has driven the tech industry for the last several years, 
in which one company comes out of nowhere and displaces the 
dominant market company. That used to be a central feature of 
technology markets, but it hasn’t happened for a long time. If you look 
at the dominant companies—Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, 
Netflix—none of them are less than fifteen years old.139 Most of them 
 
 135. See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, __ B.U. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 60–62), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3506919 [https://perma.cc/5RFT-GFX5]; Thomas Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 34), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3665040 [https://perma.cc/UM5T-HVZX]). 
 136. For a sophisticated discussion of how to balance privacy and cybersecurity with data 
portability and interoperability, see Peter Swire, The Portability and Other Required Transfers 
Impact Assessment (PORT-IA): Assessing Competition, Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Other 
Considerations (May 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) https://peterswire.net/wp-content/
uploads/PORT-IA.Swire_.March-27-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F8Q-E2SB]. 
 137. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 138. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 135 (manuscript at 4). 
 139. Id. 
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are more than twenty years old. That’s a long time to be dominant in 
the notoriously fast-moving tech industry.  
We argue in Exit Strategy that we can trace this stalled 
competition to the venture-capital model we used to fund the tech 
industry. Venture capitalists fund companies with the intention of 
cashing out sooner rather than later. While thirty years ago that cash 
out generally involved an IPO that kept the startup in the market, 
today most startup exits involve selling the company. And increasingly 
those sales are to dominant incumbents. We are encouraging founders 
not to build their company into the new Google killer, but to sell out 
and to sell out to the incumbents—to Google itself.140 We argue that 
we need more robust antitrust law restricting mergers. We also need to 
rethink the way we fund startups and reorient them toward 
competition rather than selling out to incumbents.141 
But whatever the reason we have lost it, we need competition in 
platforms. Competition is a good thing in itself. It produces better and 
cheaper services. But ironically, a more fragmented market may 
produce a more robust internet. Without competition—without 
choice—it becomes much easier to think of your internet provider as 
your regulator, insisting that the government compel them to control 
speech on their platform. Bigger, older companies may be more likely 
to comply with even unlawful or unreasonable government requests; 
they have more to lose by resisting the government. And it is easier for 
governments to regulate a single, central platform than decentralized 
technologies.  
CONCLUSION 
The genius of the internet is that because it is global and 
decentralized, there is more communication of information from more 
sources. The internet has brought us far more creativity from far more 
sources than ever before. And the reason is precisely because it wasn’t 
the information superhighway, because it was not just canonical 
providers of information that the rest of us passively consumed. On the 
internet, the providers of information are all of us. It’s everybody who 
posts on YouTube. It’s everybody who posts on a blog. The internet 
made all of us creators. That’s got some downsides. There’s a lot of 
misinformation out there. There’s a lot of political polarization that 
 
 140. Id. (manuscript at 5–7). 
 141. See id. (manuscript at 8). 
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arguably can be traced to letting a bunch of people talk who were 
otherwise keeping quiet. But the internet gives us more access to 
information, and it gives us the tools to learn more and to try to figure 
out more easily what’s right and what’s not. It is the world’s access to 
multiple different sources of information and content that is at stake 
with the splintering of the internet. 
I don’t think any of my suggestions are going to get us Barlow’s 
free and independent internet. It probably never existed. But the 
internet took off in the 1990s as an alternative to the official 
government-corporate information superhighway. The idea of five 
hundred channels of TV is a push medium with top-down control. The 
internet was an insurgent, decentralized, interoperable network with 
no one in charge. And it was a runaway success. We got the five 
hundred channels, but we got a lot more. I think we should fight hard 
not to give up the internet for an information superhighway, 
particularly one that’s controlled by our national governments.  
 
